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A DEPARTURE FROM BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY-
DECKER V. O'DONNELL
The establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution' has generated controversy in a variety of contexts, ' although
the majority of cases have concerned either the constitutional limitations
imposed on public financial assistance to sectarian schools, 3 or the permissi-
bility of prayer in public schools. 4  In the last three decades, 5 the United
States Supreme Court has struggled to articulate principled guidelines to
govern establishment clause analysis in all areas in which the issue has
arisen. 6
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. The religion clause of the first amendment
comprises two parts: the establishment clause prohibits the state from promoting religion and the
free exercise clause prohibits the state from inhibiting religion.
2. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (denial of funds for medically necessary
abortions challenged as violative of first amendment); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971) (conscientious objector exemption from military service challenged as violative of the
establishment clause); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (constitutional challenge to
property tax exemptions for religious organizations); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(first amendment challenge to statute proscribing the retail sale of certain commodities on
Sunday); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (establishment clause challenge to Sunday
closing laws); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (establishment clause challenge to
requirement of belief in God for notary public commission).
3. Since 1947, the Supreme Court has handed down nine major decisions concerning public
financial assistance to parochial schools. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For a summary of the holdings and rationales in
these cases, see notes 12-46 and accompanying text injra.
4. The Supreme Court's pronouncements on the issue of prayer in public schools are
contained in four major post-1947 decisions. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois
ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). For a summary of the holdings and
rationales in these cases, see notes 12-46 and accompanying text infra.
5. Although the first amendment was ratified in 1791, the Supreme Court did not resolve
an establishment clause controversy until 1947 in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
There are three major reasons why no establishment clause litigation was initiated before 1947.
First, many state constitutions contained more specific provisions prohibiting expenditure of
state funds for religious purposes than does the federal constitution. Second, the establishment
clause was not held applicable to the states until the Everson decision. Finally, taxpayers
challenging the expenditure of tax-raised funds had difficulty obtaining standing to sue. See R.
FLOWERS & 1n. MILLER, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY 298 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY]. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), however, the Su-
preme Court lowered the barrier against taxpayer suits challenging federal expenditures as
violations of the establishment clause.
6. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Supreme Court in formulating cogent, unified estab-
lishment clause standards, this area of constitutional law remains one of the most incomprehensi-
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The principle of governmental neutrality 7 toward religion has emerged as
the fundamental establishment clause objective that, together with the pro-
hibitions of the free exercise clause, ensures the religious liberty of each
citizen. Nevertheless, the Court has also recognized the internal tensions
between the free exercise and establishment clauses; if either is extended to
its limits, the freedoms guaranteed by the other are impaired.8 Governmen-
tal hostility toward religion, for example, would jeopardize the guarantees of
the free exercise clause. Similarly, governmental favoritism toward one reli-
gion, or toward religion over nonreligion, would violate the mandates of the
establishment clause. Thus, the neutral course is a narrow one, with the evils
of hostility and favoritism ever lurking on the sidelines.
In Decker v. O'Donnell," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was presented with a controversy unlike any decided by the
Supreme Court. At issue in Decker was the constitutionality of the Compre-
hensive Employment Training Act, 10 which authorizes a general public wel-
fare program designed to alleviate the problems of the unemployed. By
sustaining the plaintiffs' challenge and denying religious organizations the
right to participate in the program, the Decker court departed from the
neutral course charted by the Supreme Court in establishment clause anal-
ysis, and raised serious questions concerning the role of religious organiza-
tions in the public service area."
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT
Since its first encounter with an establishment clause controversy in Board
of Education v. Everson,12 the Supreme Court has experienced extreme
ble and unpredictable. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (Burger, C.J.)
("Candor compels acknowledgement, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Ilt is far easier to agree on the purpose that
underlies the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses than to obtain agree-
ment on the standards that should govern their application."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
325 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The wall which the Court was professing to erect between
Church and State has become even more warped and twisted than I [had] expected."). See also
Ellington, The Principle of Political Nondivisiveness and the Constitutionality of Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 5 GA. L. REv. 429, 434 (1971) ("Although cast in terse and absolute terms,
[the establishment clause] has been far from simple to apply to concrete cases, and the opinions
of the Justices have been notable for their lack of durability, their internal inconsistency, and
their failure to adopt a single, unifying, cogent rationale.").
7. For an extended discussion of neutrality as the fundamental principle underlying estab-
lishment clause analysis, see notes 12-46 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
9. Nos. 80-1230, 1231 & 1264 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980). See notes 71-90 and accompanying
text infra.
10. Comprehensive Employment Training Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-203, 87 Stat. 839
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (1976)). For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the Act,
see notes 47-57 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 91-142 and accompanying text infra.
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
[Vol. 30:739
1981] DECKER 741
difficulty in articulating the objectives of the establishment clause, in defin-
ing the relationship between the free exercise and establishment clauses, and,
most conspicuously, in developing standards to govern establishment clause
analysis in the myriad fact situations in which the issue arises.' 3 The Ever-
son decision illustrates one of the major obstacles that has plagued the
Court-consistently identifying and applying fundamental establishment
clause principles. Justice Black, writing for the Everson majority, expressed
the objectives of the establishment clause using strict separationist lan-
guage. 14  Notwithstanding this language, the Court upheld a state statute
authorizing reimbursements to parents of parochial school children for bus
transportation to and from school.' 5  The Court stated that the establish-
ment clause, though prohibiting direct aid to religious activities, did not
prohibit the state from extending the benefits of its public welfare legisla-
tion'" to all its citizens without regard to their religious affiliation, even
though religious organizations may be indirectly benefited.' 7
13. See note 2 supra.
14. In what is probably the most frequently quoted passage in establishment clause case law,
Mr. justice Black stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, . . .whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect a "wall of separation between church and State."
330 U.S. at 15-16.
There are at least two basic approaches to interpretation of the establishment clause. One such
approach is labeled the "accommodationist" position. This viewpoint argues that governmental
aid to religion is constitutionally permissible if that aid is provided impartially among the various
religious groups. See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962). The other major approach,
the "separationist" position, views the establishment clause as prohibiting state provision of aid
to any religious group, regardless of the equity of apportionment. See L. PFFFER, CHURCH,
STATE, AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967).
15. 330 U.S. at 18.
16. The Everson Court cited police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal,
public highways and sidewalks, as general public welfare services. Id. at 17. Public welfare
legislation is designed to generate benefits to be shared in common by all members of a
community, as opposed to legislation tailored to serve the interests of a more limited, specialized
group.
17. Recognizing the interplay of the free exercise and establishment clauses, the Court stated
that while the establishment clause prohibits a state from contributing to the support of a
religious organization, nevertheless "[the state] cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation." Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
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Despite the strict separationist language in Everson, the Supreme Court
has since recognized that complete separation of church and state is neither
mandated by the establishment clause, nor possible in a highly complex and
regulated society."8 Rather, the principle of neutral governmental relations
with religion has been identified as the fundamental objective of the estab-
lishment clause.19 Furthermore, the religion clauses of the first amendment
are read as correlative commands designed to protect individual religious
liberty.20 Because both the free exercise and establishment clauses speak in
18. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760
(1973) ("It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of [complete]
selaration. ... ); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Our prior holdings do not
call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute
sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable."); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) ("Separation in [the establishment clause] context
cannot mean absence of all contact; the complexities of modern life inevitably produce some
contact .... "); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("We err in the first place if we do not recognize, as a matter of history and as a
matter of the imperatives of our free society, that religion and government must necessarily
interact in countless ways."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) ("The First Amend-
ment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church
and State."); Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 255-56 (1948) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) ("The prohibition of enactments respecting the establishment of religion do not bar
every friendly gesture between church and state. It is not an absolute prohibition against every
conceivable situation where the two may work together. ... ).
19. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion."); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The
attitude of government toward religion must . . . . be one of neutrality."); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("In the relationship between man and religion, the
State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment leaves the Government in a position not of
hostility to religion but of neutrality."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The
government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.").
Perhaps the best description of the neutrality requirement was delivered by Chief Justice
Burger in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (upholding property tax exemptions
for religious organizations). Chief Justice Burger stated:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been
said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established
religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly pro-
scribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsor-
ship and without interference.
For a general discussion of the establishment clause and the substantial neutrality require-
ment, see Bird, Freedom from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School Instruction and
Religious School Regulations, 2 H.Av. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 125 (1979).
20. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("These two [religion clauses] are to be read together, and in light of the single end
which they are designed to serve. The basic purpose of the religion clause of the First Amend-
ment is to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty .... "); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (" 'Establishment' and 'free
exercise' were correlative . . . ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and
fundamental freedom.").
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absolutes, internal tension exists between the two proscriptions; either man-
date carried to its limits would tend to encroach upon the sphere of the
other.2 1  Governmental neutrality eases this tension and promotes the indi-
vidual religious liberty guaranteed by the first amendment. 22
To ensure neutrality, the Court has devised three tests by which establish-
ment clause compliance is measured. First, a statute must have a purely
secular legislative purpose.2 3  Second, the primary effect of the statute must
neither advance nor inhibit religion.2 4 Finally, a statute must not foster an
excessive degree of church-state entanglement. The excessive entanglement
test, the most difficult of the three tests to apply in concrete situations, was
first formulated by the Court in Walz v. Tax Commission.25  At issue in
Walz was the constitutionality of tax exemptions for church-owned prop-
erty. ' After determining that the exemption provision had a secular pur-
21. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled
to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to [its] logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 416 (1962) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]t is.the
Court's duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause of
the Constitution and the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Court."). See also Katz,
Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 426, 428 (1963); Kauper, Prayer,
Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1053 (1963).
22. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973)
("[T]his Court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise
and the Establishment Clauses . . . . As a result of this tension, our cases require the State to
maintain an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting' religion.").
23. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962). In Schempp, the Court invali-
dated two state statutes that required public school teachers to begin each school day with a
reading from the Bible. Recognizing the interrelationship between the free exercise and estab-
lishment clauses, the Court posited this test to ensure neutral state action:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect [which) neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
Id. at 222.
24. Id. In Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the
Court enlarged the scope of the primary effect test by interpreting it as requiring any benefit
derived by religious organizations to be indirect, remote, and incidental. Id. at 783 n.39. For a
more comprehensive discussion of the secular purpose and primary effect tests, see L. TRUBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14(8), at 835-46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE).
25. 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
26. Id. at 666-67. The tax exemption is authorized by the New York Constitution which
provides:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may
be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used exclu-
sively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes as defined by law and owned
by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one or more
of such purposes and not operating for profit.
N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1.
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pose and primary effect,27 the Court stated that a statute must also be
analyzed in terms of the resulting relationship between church and state. 28
The Court identified the critical questions as whether the involvement is
excessive, and whether "it is a continuing one calling for official and continu-
ing surveillance"29 of religious activities. The purpose of the test is to prevent
"active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 30  Although the
tax exemption in Walz was upheld, 31 other attacks on state aid to religious
organizations have been sustained because the aid programs were found to
foster excessive church-state entanglements. 32
In addition to the tests of secular purpose, primary effect, and excessive
entanglement, the Court has recently voiced yet another establishment con-
cern. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,33 stated that because "political division along religious lines was one of
27. 397 U.S. at 672-74.
28. The Court stated: "Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not
aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end the inquiry, however. We
must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion. The test is inescapably one of degree." Id. at 674.
29. Id. at 675. A direct money subsidy was cited by the Court as an example of an aid
program "pregnant with involvement and .... encompass[ing] sustained and detailed adminis-
trative relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards . Id.
30. Id. at 668.
31. The Court found that either alternative, taxation or exemption, involves some degree of
entanglement. Taxation of church property, however, would involve the government in prop-
erty evaluations, tax liens, and tax foreclosures. Weighing this involvement against the indirect
benefit afforded churches by the exemption, the Court decided that the establishment clause did
not require invalidation of the tax exemption. Id. at 674-75.
32. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (invalidating reimbursements to sectarian
schools for costs of field trips); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (invalidating provision of
auxiliary services, instructional materials and other educational equipment); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating direct money grants
for maintenance and repair of sectarian school facilities); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Relig. Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (invalidating state reimbursement of sectarian schools for
costs of administering and grading state-prepared tests, keeping state mandated attendance
records, and complying with other reporting requirements); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971) (invalidating program under which secular educational services are "purchased" from
sectarian schools).
The notion of excessive entanglement has arisen almost exclusively in the context of state aid to
religious elementary and secondary schools. Arguably, the notion has relevance only in that
context because of the pervasively religious character of those institutions. The problem of
excessive entanglement arises when "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance" is necessary to ensure that public funds are not being used for religious purposes.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-19 (1971). The need for the surveillance does not arise,
however, because of a risk that religious authorities will engage in bad faith diversion of the
funds. Rather, the need arises because in some cases it is impossible to separate secular activities
from sectarian ones for funding purposes. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980). In those cases, the aid program is struck down as unconstitutional.
For a comprehensive discussion of the excessive entanglement test, see TRIBE, supra note 24,
§ 14(12), at 865-80.
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). At issue in Lemon was the constitutionality of two statutes: a Rhode
Island statute authorizing salary supplements to nonpublic teachers of secular subjects, and a
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the principal evils against which the [establishment clause] was intended to
protect," 34 a statute that creates a potential for such divisiveness may be
invalidated on that basis. 35  Unfortunately, the contours of the political
divisiveness test, which has been subject to criticism since Lemon,36 have
never been clearly delineated by the Court. To date, however, no statute has
been invalidated solely on the basis of its potential for political divisive-
ness. 37  In fact, in two recent establishment clause decisions, the Court
summarily dismissed claims that the challenged statutes created political
division .3
Throughout the development of establishment clause analysis, which has
been conducted primarily in the educational arena, the Court has contin-
ually stressed two points. First, the establishment clause does not prohibit the
state from financing the purely secular activities of religious groups. 39  In
Pennsylvania statute authorizing the state to "purchase" secular educational services from non-
public schools.
34. 403 U.S. at 622. To support his position, the Chief Justice cited an article written by
Professor Paul Freund, see Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1680,
1692 (1969), and to Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694
(1970). Both sources provide weak support for this statement. The Freund article, for example,
consists primarily of the author's opinion and is unsupported by any historical references. See
Valente & Stanmeyer, Public Aid to Parochial Schools-A Reply to Professor Freund, 59 GEo.
L.J. 59 (1970). Justice Harlan's remarks, on the other hand, cannot be interpreted as excluding
religious organizations from the benefits derived from tax-raised funds. See notes 105-11 and
accompanying text infra.
35. 403 U.S. at 624. It remains unclear from Chief Justice Burger's opinion whether the
Court will invalidate an enactment solely on the basis of its potential for political division. There
is, however, reason to believe that the Court would not. Apparently, only two Justices, Brennan
and Marshall, believe that political division alone can serve as the basis for invalidation of a
statute. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by
Justice Marshall, expressed his view that the large amount of money appropriated to parochial
schools in Ohio "compel[led] . . . the conclusion that a divisive political potential of unusual
magnitude inheres in the Ohio program. This suffices without more to require the conclusion
that the Ohio statute in its entirety offends the First Amendment's prohibition against laws
,respecting an establishment of religion.' " Id. at 256.
36. See note 128 infra.
37. TIUBE, supra note 24, § 14(12), at 868.
38. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court upheld a state statute that
authorized the provision of auxiliary services to children attending nonpublic schools. The Court
rejected the claim that the program fostered political division, reasoning that any controversy
.provoked by the program would not focus on religion. Id. at 243 n.l. Similarly, in Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), the Court approved state
reimbursement to nonpublic schools for the costs of administering and grading state mandated
tests. Again the Court dismissed the claim that the statute created a divisive potential because the
state reimbursed only "actual costs." Id. at 850 n.8.
39. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775
(1973) ("These cases simply recognize that sectarian schools perform secular, educational func-
tions as well as religious functions, and that some form of aid may be channeled to the secular
without providing direct aid to the sectarian."); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245
(1968) ("[tlhis Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious
instruction and secular education"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (Court
held that education provided by Catholic schools sufficiently secular to satisfy compulsory
education requirement).
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Bradfield v. Roberts,'40 for example, the Court approved an appropriation to
a Catholic hospital, emphasizing that the religious group was serving a
purely secular function that the state had an interest in promoting. 41 Sec-
ond, the principle of neutrality required that benefits generated by general
public welfare legislation not be denied individuals or groups of individuals
solely on the basis of their religious ties. Thus, in Everson v. Board of
Education,'42 the Court upheld a bus fare reimbursement plan as a public
welfare program designed to help transport all school children to and from
school. Similarly, in Board of Education v. Allen,'43 the Court approved a
state statute authorizing textbook loans to all school children on the basis of
its character as a general welfare program. The Court has consistently
recognized that the benefits that religious organizations may derive from this
kind of legislation do not render the statutes constitutionally defective. 44
In general, state attempts to aid parochial schools have been unsuccess-
ful,'4 5 although limited forms of aid have been approved. 46  To survive
establishment clause scrutiny, a statute must pass the tests of secular purpose,
primary effect, and excessive entanglement. Neutrality, however, is the
controlling principle and, therefore, general welfare programs or those de-
signed to support the purely secular activities of religious groups are not
violative of the establishment clause.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Comprehensive Employment Training Act of 1973 (CETA) 47 estab-
lished a general public welfare program designed to provide job training and
40. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
41. Id. at 294. The appropriation under attack was provided with the agreement that the
hospital would reserve two-thirds of its beds for indigents sent by the City Commissioner. See
also Quick Bear v. Luepp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). In Quick Bear, the Court upheld congressional
appropriations supporting religious schools on Indian reservations.
42. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
43. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
44. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973) (not every law conferring benefit to religious organizations invalid on that basis alone);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (benefit from public welfare legislation such as
police and fire protection does not render statute unconstitutional); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (purpose of establishment clause is not to handicap religious organiza-
tions by denying them the benefits of general welfare legislation).
45. See note 32 supra.
46. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
(reimbursements to sectarian schools for costs of administering and grading of state mandated
tests); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (therapeutic, guidance, and remedial educational
services for nonpublic school children if provided off nonpublic school premises; speech, hearing,
and psychological diagnostic services; standardized testing and scoring services); Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans for nonpublic school children); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (bus transportation for nonpublic school children).
47. Pub. L. No. 93-203, 87 Stat. 839 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-992 (1976)). For the
purpose and legislative history of the Act, see [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2935. In 1978
the Act was reenacted with substantial revisions designed to provide improved employment and
training services, and to extend the authorization of the Act. Comprehensive Employment and
746
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employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, unemployed,
and underemployed persons. 48 The Act provides for a nationwide system of
comprehensive employment and training services" administered by "prime
sponsors" 50 that are primarily states and units of local government. Title II of
the Act 5' authorizes a program of transitional public service employment
and other manpower services 5 in areas with high unemployment rates. 53
Under Title II, the Department of Labor allocates funds to prime sponsors
pursuant to an approved comprehensive employment training plan submit-
ted by those entities.5 4 The prime sponsor may either hire the workers itself
or subgrant the monies to other project applicants that may be other govern-
mental units or private, nonprofit organizations.5 5 Decisions concerning the
Training Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-524, 92 Stat. 1909 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 801-999 (Supp. 1979)). For the purpose and legislative history of the reenactment and
amendments, see [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4480.
48. The stated purpose of the Act was "to provide job training and employment opportuni-
ties for economically disadvantaged, unemployed, and underemployed persons, and to assure
that training and other services lead to maximum employment opportunities and enhance
self-sufficiency by establishing a flexible and decentralized system of Federal, State, and local
programs." 29 U.S.C. § 801 (1976). In 1978, the objective of providing services that lead to
increased earning potential of the CETA workers was stated as an additional purpose of the Act.
29 U.S.C.'§ 801 (Supp. III 1979). See also [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 4492.
49. The several titles of CETA authorize a variety of activities such as: training, employ-
ment, counseling, testing, and placement services under Title I, 29 U.S.C. § 811-837 (Supp. III
1979); transitional public service employment under Title II, 29 U.S.C. §§ 841-852 (Supp. III
1979); nationally sponsored and supervised training, employment and job placement programs
for such special groups as youth, offenders, older workers, persons of limited English-speaking
ability, Indians, migrant and seasonal farmworkers, and others with particular labor market
disadvantages under Title III, 29 U.S.C. 88 871-886 (Supp. III 1979); intensive education,
training, and counseling for disadvantaged youth under Title IV, 29 U.S.C. §§ 891-945 (Supp.
III 1979); a National Commission for Manpower Policy, assigned to assess the Nation's man-
power needs and goals under Title V, 29 U.S.C. §§ 951-955 (Supp. III 1979); a temporary
emergency program of public service employment to help ease the impact of high unemployment
under Title VI, 29 U.S.C. §§ 961-970 (Supp. III 1979); and the Young Adults Conservation
Corps, which provides employment to youth who would otherwise not be productively em-
ployed, under Title VIII, 29 U.S.C. §§ 991-999 (Supp. III 1979).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 811 (Supp. III 1979).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 841-859 (Supp. III 1979).
52. Part D of Title II, 29 U.S.C. §§ 853-859 (Supp. III 1979), was added in 1978 to provide
job training and transitional employment in areas of public service for the structurally unem-
ployed which will lead to unsubsidized employment.
53. In order to qualify as a prime sponsor under Title II, the area in which the program is to
be implemented must have an unemployment rate of at least 6.5% for three consecutive months.
See [1978] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 4482.
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 802(20) & 856 (Supp. III 1979). In fiscal year 1977, $1,540,000 was
expended under Title II, 12% of the total amount expended under the Act; 352,900 persons
participated in programs authorized under Title II. See [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4491 (breakdown of funds expended during 1977 for all CETA programs).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 813 (Supp. III 1979). The comprehensive employment training plan consists
of a master plan and an annual plan that serve to inform the Department of Labor of the existing
economic conditions in the area and the means by which the prime sponsor intends to utilize the
funds most effectively to achieve the objectives of the Act. See [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 4492-95.
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subgranting of funds are to be made only after comment from the commu-
nity and on the basis of the project applicant's demonstrated ability to
provide effective job training services. 56 Sectarian schools are statutorily
excluded from participating in the CETA program as employers only to the
extent that the workers are employed to operate, construct, or maintain any
facility used for religious instruction or worship.
5 7
In late 1978, three federal taxpayers from Wisconsin brought suit in
federal district court 58 against the United States Department of Labor and
various federal, state, and local governmental officials 5 seeking an injunc-
tion prohibiting the payment of CETA funds to sectarian elementary or
secondary schools.60  The plaintiffs alleged that the employment of CETA
workers by the sectarian schools violated the establishment clause and the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.6' Following the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Department of Labor promulgated
regulations concerning the employment of CETA workers by sectarian
schools detailing the positions that would be funded in the future.62  The
56. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 813-814, 818-820 (Supp. III 1979).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 823(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
58. Decker v. Department of Labor, 485 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
59. The defendants were the United States Department of Labor, Secretary of Labor Ray
Marshall, and Milwaukee County Executive William O'Donnell. The Catholic Archdiocese of
Milwaukee, CETA employees Candace Warlin and John Broczek, and the Catholic Dioceses of
Madison, Green Bay, LaCrosse, and Superior intervened as defendants. Id. at 839.
60. The plaintiffs' complaint also demanded a permanent injunction barring any further
expenditures of CETA monies to fund positions in sectarian schools and that the defendants
recover monies already paid to the schools. Neither the circuit court of appeals nor the district
court addressed these issues.
61. 485 F. Supp. at 839.
62. 20 C.F.R. § 676.71 (1979) (current version at 20 C.F.R. § 676.71 (1981) (omitting
1 (d))). The regulations provide that CETA workers could be employed by sectarian schools as
teachers, librarians, guidance counselors, janitors, or maintenance workers, clerical workers, or
teacher aides only if they came within one of the following exceptions:
(c) Religiously affiliated elementary or secondary schools, may, subject to super-
vision by the prime sponsor, employ participants in programs such as adult educa-
tion, recreation, summer programs or other similar activities including remedial
tutorial activities, provided that such programs are not offered during regular school
hours, are not a part of the regular school curriculum (including summer school), are
open to the community at large, and in which the community is encouraged to
participate, and provided further that such programs do not involve religious activi-
ties.
(d) Nothing in this section shall preclude a prime sponsor or a subrecipient other
than a religious organization from outstationing a participant to a religiously affili-
ated elementary or secondary school for the purpose of providing remedial education
services, provided that such services do not involve religious activities and provided
further that the prime sponsor or subrecipient complies with the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 241(e), and the regulations thereunder at 20
C.F.R. §§ 1801 et seq.
(e) Participants may be employed by a religiously affiliated elementary or second-




regulations permitted funding only of those positions that do not by their
nature foster excessive governmental entanglement with religious affairs.
6 3
After reconsideration of its injunctive order in light of the new Depart-
ment of Labor regulations, the district court reaffirmed its initial decision
that the entire CETA program violated the establishment clause to the extent
that it allowed the placement of CETA workers in sectarian schools.6 4 The
court found that many of the positions funded under the new regulations did
foster excessive church-state entanglement in that a comprehensive program
of state surveillance would be required to ensure that the funds were not
being used for religious purposes.65 In addition, the court held that the
provision of funds to the schools had the effect of directly benefiting the
religious organizations because the CETA workers were, for all practical
purposes, the employees of the sectarian schools.66 Further, the method by
which the CETA funds were allocated was deemed to create a serious
potential for political division along religious lines that rendered the program
as a whole unconstitutional. 67 The court concluded by denying the defend-
ants' request that the injunction be limited to Milwaukee County, finding the
unconstitutionality of the program to depend not on the manner in which it
is administered in any particular area, but on inherent defects on the face of
(1) Cafeteria work or other work directly related to the provision of food services
to students including clerical, custodial or maintenance work related to such serv-
ices.
(2) Diagnostic or therapeutic speech and hearing services including clerical work
related to such services.
(3) Nursing or health services or any other activities relating to the health or
safety of students (e.g., assisting on school buses or in escorting children to and from
school, acting as attendance clerks or school crossing guards, removing asbestos
hazards or performing other similar emergency service relating to the health or
safety of students), including clerical work related to such services.
(4) Any functions (including secretarial or clerical activities) where such activities
are limited to providing support services for the administration of federally funded
or regulated programs made applicable to religious institutions.
(5) Functions performed with respect to the administration and grading of State-
prepared examinations.
(6) Custodial child care after school hours provided the participant is not provid-
ing educational services.
63. The Regulations were worded to conform to the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the
forms of aid which can be provided to religious schools. See notes 23-46 and accompanying text
supra.
64. 485 F. Supp. at 842-43.
65. Id. at 841-42.
66. Id. at 843. The district court, noting that the CETA workers receive their paychecks
from the Archdiocese, are hired and fired by the Archdiocese, and are subject to the daily
supervision of the religious authorities, found that the workers were properly considered em-
ployees of the Archdiocese, not the federal government. Therefore, the court concluded that
"[no matter what positions are filled by these workers, this type of direct subsidization provides
the affected religious institutions with direct and tangible benefits. When such benefits are
conferred out of public funds, the result is a violation of the First Amendment." Id.
67. Id.
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the statute.6 8 The defendants, joined by several intervenors,69 appealed the
district court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.70
THE DECKER OPINION
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit began its opinion by briefly
surveying the Supreme Court's pronouncements concerning the constitution-
ality of state aid to sectarian schools. 7' The tests of secular purpose, primary
effect, and excessive entanglement were identified as the signposts erected by
the Court to guide establishment clause analysis.7 2  Because the secular
legislative purpose of the CETA program was undisputed,7 3 the court's anal-
ysis focused on whether the program had a primary effect which either
advanced or inhibited religion, and whether it fostered an impermissible
degree of governmental entanglement with the sectarian schools.
74
68. Id. at 844. It should be noted that the district court made detailed findings of fact that
focused only on the operation of the CETA program in Milwaukee County and specifically on
the funds allocated to the Catholic Archdiocese of Milwaukee. Id. at 839-41.
69. The Department of Labor appealed the district court's decision only with regard to its
termination of instructional positions in adult education programs and other noninstructional
positions, and amended its regulations to prohibit the outstationing of CETA workers in all other
positions invalidated by the court. See 20 C.F.R. § 676.71(c) (1981). The intervening defend-
ants, however, urged that all the positions in the labor regulations were constitutionally permis-
sible. The circuit court, therefore, considered the validity of all those positions properly before it.
In addition, amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of the Catholic Bishop of Chicago, and
also on behalf of the Agudath Israel of America, the National Jewish Commission on Law and
Public Affairs, the National Council of Young Israel, Torah Umesorah, and the Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America.
70. Decker v. O'Donnell, Nos. 80-1230, 1231 & 1264 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980).
71. Decker v. O'Donnell, Nos. 80-1230, 1231 & 1264, slip op. at 9-17 (7th Cir. Sept. 9,
1980). The court acknowledged establishment clause analysis as "one of the murkier regions of
constitutional law."
72. Id. at 9-11. The court stated that these tests "are designed to protect against the primary
evils of government's sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity ..... Id. Rejecting the defendant's argument that the character of the CETA
program as a general welfare program justified a less stringent standard of review, the court held
that these tests apply in all establishment clause cases regardless of the nature of the challenged
statute. Id. at 10 n.13.
The court also delineated the contents of each of the tests. The effect test was deemed to
require that any benefit to religious organizations be remote, incidental, and indirect. The
excessive entanglement test was broken down into two components: administrative entangle-
ment and political entanglement. The court also identified three factors to be considered in
determining whether an aid program would foster excessive administrative entanglement: "(1)
the character and purposes of the benefitted institutions, (2) the nature of the aid provided, and
(3) the resulting relationship between the State and the religious authority." Id. at 11 (citing
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976)).
73. Decker v. O'Donnell, slip op. at 12.
74. Id. at 16. Before commencing its analysis, the Decker court identified four characteristics
common to the positions permitted under the Department of Labor regulations. First, the
institutions were primarily religious primary and secondary schools. Second, the CETA workers
were more properly considered employees of the schools than of the federal government because
they were subject to the daily supervision of the school authorities. Third, the CETA program
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The Decker court examined each position permitted under the Depart-
ment of Labor regulations individually to determine whether the establish-
ment clause requirements had been met. 75  The provisions permitting the
outstationing of CETA workers as remedial educational instructors, 76 sum-
mer recreational instructors 77 adult educational instructors ,78 custodial child
care workers, 79 speech and hearing therapists and diagnosticians, 8  health
and safety workers, 8 or as administrators and graders of state-prepared
tests82 were all invalidated by the court on excessive entanglement grounds.
did not require that public schools receive comparable assistance. Finally, the parochial schools
received a relatively low proportion of all CETA workers under Title II. Id. at 12.
Of these four characteristics, the court considered the nature of the schools the most significant
factor in its analysis. Because the religious elements in those schools are pervasive, the court
stated that it is extremely difficult to aid only the sectarian activities without conducting a
continuing state surveillance. Id. at 12-14.
75. Id. at 17-28. The Decker court justified its position by reference to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). In McNair, the Court upheld state funded
construction of buildings and facilities at institutions of higher learning. The Court's analysis
focused not on the effect of the program as a whole, but on the program as it affected sectarian
colleges and universities. Id. at 742. This kind of analysis is not analogous to that conducted in
Decker where the court took the "focus" one step further from the effect of the program on the
sectarian schools to the effect of each position.
76. Decker v. O'Donnell, slip op. at 17-18. The Decker court relied on Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975), to prohibit CETA funding for workers in remedial instruction positions. In
Meek, the Court held that the provision of auxiliary services by public employees on nonpublic
school premises would require a continuing state surveillance to ensure that the CETA workers
did not inadvertently convey religious beliefs. Id. at 367-72. This risk is minimized under the
CETA program because the Act prohibits hiring on the basis of religious affiliation. 29 U.S.C.
§ 834(a) (Supp. III 1979). Thus, the CETA worker providing the services would not have been of
the same religious faith as the student in every instance. Under these circumstances, no amount
of sectarian influence would be likely to cause the CETA worker to inculcate religious beliefs to
which he does not adhere.
77. Decker v. O'Donnell, slip op. at 18-19.
78. Id. at 20-21. The Supreme Court consistently has approved state aid programs for
colleges and universities despite inclusion of sectarian institutions as beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding state grants to institutions of
higher learning); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding state issuance of revenue
bonds to finance construction of college and university facilities); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971) (upholding federal construction grants for college and university facilities). This aid
has been upheld on the ground that religious indoctrination is not a primary objective of these
institutions and, thus, a high level of academic freedom prevails. See Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750-51 (1976). The Decker court rejected the argument that the age and
mental ability of an adult precluded the risk of religious indoctrination stating that "it is not
always ensured that adult education courses will match the nondoctrinaire intellectual atmo-
sphere of the colleges .. " Decker v. O'Donnell, slip op. at 20.
79. Id. at 21. The court found the risk of excessive entanglement in providing custodial child
care workers because "the line between serving as a guardian of the safety of the children and
taking a caring, parental role toward one's charges is one that in practice will be virtually
impossible for a CETA worker, even in good faith, to observe strictly." Id.
80. Id. at 22-23. See also notes 124-25 and accompanying text infra.
81. Decker v. O'Donnell, slip op. at 23-24.
82. Id. at 24-25.
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The court found that the pervasively religious nature of the schools would
necessitate a comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveil-
lance of each position to ensure that the CETA workers were not engaging in
prohibited religious activities.83 Other positions, such as cafeteria and main-
tenance workers, as well as some clerical positions, were found to pass both
the effect and excessive entanglement tests because those positions are suffi-
ciently secular in nature to ensure compliance with establishment clause
restrictions on state aid to sectarian schools without state surveillance.84
Although some positions passed both the effect and entanglement tests, the
Decker court nevertheless held that the establishment clause prohibited the
employment of CETA workers by sectarian schools in any capacity because
"the structure of decisionmaking about funding creates an impermissible risk
of political entanglement for the CETA program as a whole."85 Rejecting
the defendants' argument that a potential for political divisiveness serves
only as a warning signal of a constitutional violation, the Decker court
interpreted Lemon v. Kurtzman and its progeny as holding that such poten-
tial itself constitutes an establishment clause violation. 86 The potential for
political division was found to be seriously increased by the limited availabil-
ity of CETA funds, the annual nature of the appropriations, and the require-
ment that funding decisions be made only after an opportunity for comment
from the local community.87 The court feared that parochial school propo-
nents would exert political pressure on the officials responsible for making
the funding decisions, and thus create division along religious lines.8
The Decker court concluded by affirming the district court's denial of the
defendants' request that the injunction be limited to Milwaukee County.8 9
Because it found the CETA program facially unconstitutional, the court
declared that the injunction be permanent and nationwide.90
CRITICISM OF THE DECKER COURT's ANALYSIS
The Decker court's analysis is subject to criticism on three grounds. First,
by failing to recognize the CETA program as general social welfare legisla-
tion, the Decker court reached a conclusion that undermines the establish-
ment clause principle of governmental neutrality and places a constitutional
83. See notes 76-82 supra.
84. Decker v. O'Donnell, slip op. at 26-28. The court found that the only clerical positions
that passed the effect and administrative entanglement tests were those connected with food
services and safety-related school transportation services. Id. See also notes 120-21 and accompa-
nying text infra.
85. Id. at 28-29.
86. Id. at 29 n.34.
87. Id. at 30-31.
88. Id. at 31-32. See also notes 126-42 and accompanying text infra.
89. Decker v. O'Donnell, slip op. at 32-34. The Decker court countered the defendants'
objections to the nationwide injunction by stating that its analysis had focused primarily on the
language of the Act and the accompanying regulations and that the evidence of Milwaukee
County practices was used merely as an illustration.
90. Id. at 1.
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cloud over similar types of aid programs. Second, the Decker court applied
the test of excessive entanglement too strictly and thereby reached results
with respect to particular positions inconsistent with prior establishment
clause decisions. Finally, the Decker court's invalidation of the CETA pro-
gram on the basis of its perceived potential for political division is unsupport-
able by Supreme Court precedent and deprives communities of one of their
most valuable sources of social welfare services.
The CETA Program as Social Welfare Legislation
Throughout the Nation's history, religious organizations have adminis-
tered to the secular needs of their communities by providing valuable social
welfare services. 1 Church groups and religious orders have established and
maintained hospitals, nursing homes, orphanages, and counseling centers;
jobs, food, and emergency housing have also been provided. 2 Initially,
religious organizations relied solely on the generosity of their members to
finance these social welfare services.9 3  As the economy declined and the
problems associated with the rapid growth of our country proliferated, the
government expanded its reach into the area of social welfare.9 4  Because
private, charitable groups were already equipped with facilities and trained
personnel, the state found that it could effectively advance its social welfare
interests by contracting to buy these services from them.', Religious and
nonreligious groups alike have shared in what is, in effect, direct governmen-
tal subsidization of their social welfare programs. 9 Provision of financial
assistance to these charitable organizations is motivated by mounting de-
91. See generally B. COUGHLIN, CHURCH AND STATE IN SOCIAL WELFARE 133-37 (1965).
[hereinafter cited as COUCHLIN]. The Supreme Court itself explicitly recognized the contribu-
tions to social welfare made by religious organizations when it stated: "We find it unnecessary to
justify the tax exemption on the social welfare services or 'good works' that some churches
perform for parishioners and others-family counselling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and
to children." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (upholding real property tax
exemptions for religious organizations).
92. COUGHLIN, supra note 91, at 133-37. See also Amicus Curiae Brief for the Catholic
Bishop of Chicago at 1-3, Decker v. O'Donnell, Nos. 80-1230, 1231 & 1264 (7th Cir. Sept. 9,
1980).
93. COUCHLIN, supra note 91, at 136.
94. See generally L. DAVIS, AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 658-62 (1972). The Great Depres-
sion was one of the most significant factors prompting governmental intervention in the social
welfare area. The state and private organizations, themselves struggling with the failing econ-
omy, were simply unable to accommodate the demands placed upon them by the unprecedented
number of unemployed. By 1938, federal expenditures for public welfare services had increased
to 25 times the amount expended in 1902. Id. at 661. See also Amicus Curiae Brief for the
Catholic Bishop of Chicago at 2-3.
95. COUGHLIN, supra note 91, at 134-38.
96. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago argued that "[t]oday, a religious organization, like any
other social service agency, cannot effectively provide social services to the disadvantaged
without some contact, be it regulation, assistance, or approval, with the State." Amicus Curiae
Brief for the Catholic Bishop of Chicago at 2.
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mands for state financed welfare assistance and recognition that these pri-
vate groups can often provide more effective welfare services than can a
bureaucratic, impersonal government.17 Today there are many instances of
direct state support of the welfare programs of churches and religious organi-
zations. 8
The CETA program represents an arrangement between government and
private, nonprofit organizations to provide social services. Under CETA, the
Department of Labor allocates funds to prime sponsors who may enlist the
assistance of private groups that have demonstrated an ability to deal effec-
tively with the hardcore unemployed.99 The Catholic Church is merely one
such organization that has provided successful job training and employment
opportunities in the past. 00 By denying federal funds to church-related
institutions for their secular job training endeavors, the Decker court has
ignored the fundamental establishment clause principle requiring govern-
mental neutrality between religion and nonreligion, and has raised serious
questions concerning the validity of governmental funding of other church-
sponsored welfare programs.
Moreover, judicial interpretations of the establishment clause support an
analysis contrary to that reached by the Decker court. The tests of secular
purpose, primary effect, and excessive entanglement were designed as means
by which signs of either governmental support of religion or governmental
hostility toward religion could be detected.' 0' Either governmental stance
threatens the religious liberty protected by the first amendment. The Decker
court was correct in observing the "signposts" erected by the Supreme Court
to guide establishment clause analysis. The objection, however, lies with the
framework in which the tests were applied. The Decker court analyzed the
CETA program as though it represented yet another legislative attempt to
aid the educational function of sectarian institutions, an area concededly
fraught with difficulty because of the intermingling of secular and religious
instruction by those institutions. 02 Overlooked by the Decker court was the
substance of the relationship between church and state arising under the
CETA program. The intended beneficiaries of the CETA program are not
the religious organizations, but the CETA workers who lack the job skills
97. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part
II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 555 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Giannella].
98. Examples include federal grants for hospital construction under the Hill-Burton Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 291-2910 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), federal grants under Title II of the Economic
Opportunity Act for various community action projects conducted by religious groups, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2781-2831 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), or public grants to religious orphanages for the care and
maintenance of wards of the state.
99. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
100. In Chicago, for example, the Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago had the highest percent-
age of exemplary job sites and in many areas the highest rate of success in placing its trainees in
permanent jobs. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the Catholic Bishop of Chicago at 2.
101. See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra.
102. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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necessary to obtain unsubsidized employment. The structure of the CETA
program, moreover, encourages an alliance between the state and private
groups for the purpose of providing needed job training and employment
opportunities. Because the provision of these services represents a secular
activity, all entities applying for CETA funds should be considered without
regard to their religious affiliation. 10 3 A contrary result would indicate a
governmental preference for secularism, a position equally deleterious to the
religious freedom guaranteed by the first amendment. 04
Earlier decisions of the Supreme Court support the proposition that reli-
gious organizations may share in the benefits generated by public welfare
legislation even though it may be impossible to ensure that the religious
activities of those organizations are not incidentally benefited.10 5 For exam-
ple, in Walz v. Tax Commission'"8 the Court upheld a New York constitu-
tional provision exempting religious organizations from payment of real
property taxes. Because the provision also exempted other nonprofit and
charitable organizations "consider[ed] . . . , as beneficial and stabilizing
influences in community life,"1'07 the Court found that nothing in the estab-
lishment clause required that religious organizations be denied privileges
accorded other similar institutions.'08  Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate
opinion, viewed the critical question as "whether the circumference of legis-
lation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious
103. See Giannella, supra note 97, at 554-60. See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
16 (1947) (recognizing the state's right to extend the benefits of its public welfare legislation to all
its citizens without regard to religious affiliation despite incidental benefits derived by sectarian
institutions).
104. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Court
* . .believes that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment not only [requires] religious
neutrality on the part of government but also requires that this Court go further and throw its
weight on the side of those who believe that our society . . .should be a purely secular one.").
See also Louisell, Does the Constitution Require a Purely Secular Society? 26 CATH. U.L. Rv.
20 (1976) (author decries recent Supreme Court decisions as requiring the government to
promote secularism in all state-related activities); Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Estab-
lishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1970 B.Y. L. REV. 184, 211 n.108 ("When
governmental welfare was not the order of the day, aid to religion was much less defensible.
Today, when government benefits and entitlements are provided to nearly everyone, to deny
only theists such aid is an unjustifiable discrimination that makes competition between theism
and secularism virtually impossible.").
105. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
106. 397 U.S. 664 (1971).
107. Id. at 673.
108. Id. at 672-73. The Court stated:
[The state] has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even
churches as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship
within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations
which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical,
and patriotic groups.
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institutions could be thought to fall within the natural parameters." 09 In
such cases, neutrality prohibits the government from engaging in what he
termed "religious gerrymander[ing]."110 Therefore, according to the Supreme
Court the establishment clause does not require that religious organizations
be excluded from sharing in the benefits of legislation designed to benefit a
broad class of private, nonprofit groups nor to receive state aid for their
purely secular welfare activities."'
The Decker Court's Application of the Excessive
Entanglement Standard
The Decker court invalidated several positions permitted under the labor
regulations on excessive entanglement grounds.1 2  Because the Decker court
improperly applied the excessive entanglement standards too strictly, many
of the findings with respect to particular positions are inconsistent with
recent Supreme Court decisions upholding state provision of services identi-
cal or substantially similar to those provided by CETA workers.
The determination that a statutory aid program creates excessive entangle-
ment is "inescapably one of degree." 113  Complete state noninvolvement
with religious organizations is neither required nor possible in a highly
regulated society.' ' 4 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"[f]ire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements
under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and
permissible contacts."1 5  Church-state entanglement becomes excessive pri-
marily in the context of state aid to religious elementary and secondary
schools." 6 Although the Court has repeatedly stressed that a state may
finance secular functions performed by religious institutions, in some in-
109. Id. at 696 (Harlan, J., separate opinion). Justice Brennan, concurring in the Walz
decision, viewed the establishment clause as prohibiting those aid programs that "(a) serve the
essentially religious activities of religious [organizations]; (b) employ the organs of government
for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means . . . ,where secular means
would suffice." Id. at 680. He concluded, however, that the tax exemptions did not violate the
establishment clause because the religious organizations were "among a range of other private,
nonprofit organizations [that] contribute to the well-being of the community in a variety of
nonreligious ways, and thereby bears burdens that would otherwise . . . be left undone, to the
detriment of the community." Id. at 687.
110. Id. at 696.
111. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra. See also Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 301 (1963) (Brennan J., concurring) ("If religious institutions benefit, it
is in spite of rather than because of their religious character. For religious institutions simply
share [the] benefits which government makes generally available to educational, charitable, and
eleemosynary groups.").
112. See notes 76-84 and accompanying text supra.
113. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1971).
114. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. See also Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 745 (1976) ("A system of government that makes itself felt as pervasively as ours could
hardly be expected never to cross paths with the church.").
115. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1970).
116. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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stances it may be impossible to separate these secular functions from religious
ones without conducting a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
surveillance"''7  to ensure that the funds are not inadvertently used to ad-
vance religious beliefs." 8  The notion of excessive entanglement, however,
does not involve the risk that religious officials will engage in bad faith
diversion of public funds; rather, the problem arises when the state no longer
supplies a readily separable secular aid program."19
The Decker court failed to recognize the excessive entanglement test as one
of degree and seemed to require absolute assurance that some services pro-
vided by the CETA workers would not further, even incidentally, religious
practices or beliefs. In its discussion of adjunct custodial or maintenance
services related to cafeteria work, for example, the Decker court rejected the
claim that those positions could be held by CETA workers because they were
essentially secular and nonidealogical in nature.'2 0 Instead, the Decker
court found that these positions would occasionally require the handling of
religious insignia such as at father-son banquets and breakfasts in honor of
the Archbishop.' 2' The Decker court also invalidated the placement of
CETA workers as nurses because the regulations did not exclude "services
treating high school children on matters of sexuality, sexual hygiene, and
mental health."' 22  Because the possibility existed, albeit slight, that nurses
might inculcate religious values in these areas, the court found that continu-
ing surveillance would be necessary to ensure compliance with establishment
clause restrictions.' 23
The Decker court also erred by invalidating some positions indistinguish-
able from those previously upheld by the Supreme Court. For example, the
Decker court found that the placement of CETA workers as speech and
hearing diagnosticians fostered excessive entanglement. Although the court
117. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1970).
118. Id. The Lemon Court struck down a state statute authorizing salary supplements to
teachers of secular subjects in sectarian schools on excessive entanglement grounds because it
found that "[u]nlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and
intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the
First Amendment." Id.
119. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980)
("[W]e are not prepared to read into the plan as an inevitability the bad faith upon which any
future excessive entanglement would be predicated."); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247
(1977) ("The danger [of excessive entanglement] exists there, not because the public employee
was likely deliberately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather because the
pressures of the environment might alter [its] behavior from its normal course."). See also TRIBE,
supra note 24, at 890.
120. Decker v. O'Donnell, Nos. 80-1230, 1231 & 1264, slip op. at 27 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 23.
123. Id. By invalidating the outstationing of CETA workers in positions relating to health and
safety, the Decker court completely disregarded the finding of the Supreme Court that there
exists a "class of general welfare services for children that may be provided by the State
regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues to church-related schools." Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 371 n.21 (1975).
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acknowledged that the Supreme Court, in Wolman v. Walter, approved a
statutory program authorizing public employees to provide these same serv-
ices in sectarian institutions, it found these services distinguishable because
they were provided as part of a "circuit-riding" program. 2 4 Yet nothing in
the Wolman opinion indicated that the Court relied on this factor in uphold-
ing the aid program in question. Instead, the Court stressed that the risk of
intrusion of religious beliefs was minimized because the diagnostician had
limited contact with particular students, not because little time was spent in
the religious schools. 25
The Decker Court's Use of the Political Divisiveness Test
The Decker court also erred in invalidating the CETA program on the basis
of what the court perceived as a potential for political divisiveness. 26 Neither
the Lemon decision nor subsequent establishment clause cases support the
proposition relied upon by the Decker court that political divisiveness can
alone warrant invalidation of a statute that otherwise survives establishment
clause scrutiny. 27  Since Lemon, commentators have criticized the remarks
of Chief Justice Burger regarding the evils of political division along religious
lines.2 8  Some have interpreted these remarks as prohibiting all forms of
political activity by religious organizations and have criticized the notion as
124. Decker v. O'Donnell, slip op. at 22 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)).
125. The Wolman Court stated:
The reason for considering diagnostic services to be different from teaching or
counseling is readily apparent. First, diagnostic services, unlike teaching or counsel-
ing, have little or no educational content and are not closely associated with the
educational mission of the nonpublic school. Accordingly, any pressure on the public
diagnostician to allow the intrusion of sectarian views is greatly reduced. Second, the
diagnostician has only limited contact with the child, and that contact involves
chiefly the use of objective and professional testing methods to detect students in
need of treatment. The nature of the relationship between the diagnostician and the
pupil does not provide the same opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views
as attends the relationship between teacher and student or that between counselor
and student.
433 U.S. at 244.
126. See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
127. See notes 136-38 and accompanying text infra.
128. See, e.g.,Clark, Comments on Some Policies Underlying the Constitutional Law of
Religious Freedom, 64 MINN. L. REv. 453, 534 (1980) (argues that religious conflict is no more
deleterious than other kinds of political conflict); Fink, The Establishment Clause According to
the Supreme Court: The Mysterious Eclipse of Free Exercise Values, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 207,
259 (1978) (suggests the application of political divisiveness test creates more conflict, not less);
Kauper, Public Aid for Parochial Schools and Church Colleges: The Lemon, Dicenso and Tilton
Cases, 13 ARiz. L. Ray. 567, 588 (1971) (argues political divisiveness test inhibits free exercise of
religion); Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the Public
Schools, 1979 B.Y. L. REv. 177, 194-96 (criticizes political divisiveness test as infringing on
rights of free exercise, free association, free speech, and free press); Weber, School Aid and
Political Divisiveness, 38 JuIUST 203, 206-08 (1978) (suggesting that legislatures, rather than
courts, are proper forums to resolve religious conflict).
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an impermissible burden on the free speech and participation rights of these
organizations in the political process. 121
As interpreted by the Decker court, the potential for political divisiveness
effectively precludes religious groups from seeking to secure governmental
funding for their secular as well as sectarian activities. The notion of political
divisiveness, however, has been deemed relevant only when religious groups
seek governmental funding for their religious activities. 30 In Wolman v.
Walter,131 the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the challenged aid
program created an impermissible risk of political divisiveness, reasoning
that the resulting conflict would not focus on religion because the aid pro-
vided was essentially secular in nature. 32  The Wolman court thereby ex-
plicitly recognized that all political debate among or participated in by
religious groups is not constitutionally suspect but only that debate which
centers on governmental funding for religious activities. Therefore, the
Decker court erred in applying the political divisiveness test in a situation
where funding was sought for purely secular welfare activities.
The Decker court's erroneous application of the political divisiveness test
adversely effects both the ability of religious groups to provide effective
welfare services 33 and the efficient allocation of state funds in the social
welfare sphere. Under the CETA program, funding decisions are made on
the basis of an applicant's demonstrated ability to train and place the unem-
ployed; ' 34 religious values or beliefs play no role in the decision making
process. To deny eligibility to religious groups on the basis of their character
as such deprives the community of what historically has been one of the most
fertile sources of welfare services. 3 -
In addition, the Decker court placed excessive analytical weight on the risk
of political divisiveness in scrutinizing the CETA program. According to the
Decker court, if a statute fosters division along religious lines, it can be
invalidated on that basis alone even if it otherwise passes the tests of secular
129. It is clear, however, that the Court did not mean to suppress the political activities of
religious groups on all issues. The Walz Court acknowledged that "[aldherents of particular
faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues including ....
vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions." The Court was quick to add, however,
that "churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that right." Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
130. See L. PFn,'xa, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 55-63 (1975); TRIBE, supra note
24, § 14-12 at 867. See also Walz v. Tax Conmm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) (recognizing right of
religious groups to engage in legislative advocacy).
131. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
132. Id. at 243 n. 11. The Wolman Court stated that "the Ohio program is... not susceptible
to the intrusion of sectarian overtones. Since it is not likely to be seen as involving aid to religion,
any controversy it provokes will not focus on religion. In fact, it is hard to believe that religious
controversy would be generated by the offer of uniform health services for all school children."
Id. (emphasis added).
133. See note 96 supra.
134. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
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purpose, primary effect, and excessive entanglement. 3  As previously
noted, political divisiveness has never played such a decisive role in the
Supreme Court's establishment clause analysis. 37  Instead, the Supreme
Court has characterized political divisiveness as a "warning signal" of some
future establishment clause violation rather than as an independent constitu-
tional infirmity. 38  By erroneously elevating political divisiveness to the
status of an additional establishment clause test, the Decker court seriously
impaired the right of religious groups to compete for governmental funding
for their social welfare activities along with other charitable organizations.
Finally, the Decker court based its decision on what it determined to be
the program's potential for political division rather than on actual, demon-
strated political conflict. 39  The Archdiocese of Milwaukee, however, had
been receiving CETA funds since 1977, and presumably such conflict would
have surfaced by the time of the Decker litigation.140  Yet neither the court
nor the plaintiffs pointed to any evidence of such conflict among the appli-
cants or in the community. Instead, the Decker court found that the annual
nature of the funding process and the requirement that decisions be made
only after community comment created an impermissible risk of religious
conflict.' 4' The legislature, however, rather than the judiciary, is the
proper forum to assess the degree of conflict generated by prospective litiga-
tion and to channel this conflict in a manner that acheives optimal
results. 14 2  By attempting to gauge the degree of political conflict likely to
136. Decker v. O'Donnell, Nos. 80-1230, 1231 & 1264, slip op. at 29 n.34 (7th Cir. Sept. 9,
1980).
137. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
138. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973)
(indicating that "while the prospect of [political] divisiveness may not alone warrant the invali-
dation of state laws that otherwise survives the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of this
Court, it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ignored"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
624-25 (1971) (political entanglement constitutes a "warning signal" of "an evitable progression
leading to the establishment of state churches and state religion").
139. Decker v. O'Donnell, slip. op. at 30-32.
140. Id. at 4. In its amicus curiae brief, the Catholic Bishop of Chicago stated that the City
had requested the Chicago Archdiocese to participate in the CETA program, and indicated that
"[t]here has not been nor can we envision a divisive scramble here for federal monies to serve the
poor." Id. at 6.
141. Id. at 30-32.
142. See Weber, School Aid and Political Divisions, 38 JURIST 203, 206-08 (1978). Weber
asserts that the judiciary is improperly equipped to handle conflict arising from differing
religious views; he argues that it is precisely in the legislatures that such conflicts must be
resolved. See also Kauper, Public Aid For Parochial Schools and Church Colleges: The Lemon,
Dicenso and Tilton Cases, 13 Aiuz. L. REv. 567 (1971). Kauper argues as follows:
If the Court is going to use its judicial power through interpretation of the
establishment clause to foreclose from the realm of public debate and the legislative
process any measures which will excite division along religious lines, it will be
embarking on a dubious journey. If institutions and groups feel that it is unjust to




arise under the CETA program, the Decker court improperly usurped the
function of the legislature.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Decker court may have a wide ranging impact both on
the structure of state-financed social welfare activities and on the continuing
development of establishment clause analysis. The Decker court's refusal to
recognize the unique church-state relationship arising under the CETA pro-
gram and to alter its analysis accordingly casts considerable doubt on the
constitutionality of similar church-sponsored welfare programs.
Concededly, the neutral course charted by the first amendment has not
always been an easy one to locate and has been badly blurred due to a
wavering Supreme Court attitude. But the Decker court's decision represents
such a sharp departure from the benevolent neutrality that promotes reli-
gious freedoms that future judicial responses in this area will be impossible to
predict. This threat of unpredictability is further enhanced by the Decker
court's interpretation and consequent application of the political divisiveness
test which can accurately be labelled "the fourth establishment clause test"
in the Seventh Circuit.
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